Sample Essay on Is Representative Government In Crisis In Europe

Is Representative Government in Crisis in Europe?

Introduction

            A representative government defines a type of government established under the principle of selected individuals that represent as well as act on behalf of another group of people. A representative government refers to a type of leadership by a small group of people on behalf of the larger group. According to Seward (2009), a representative government allows a small group of trusted individuals to represent the wider society in political activities that would enhance the overall wellbeing of the largest number of people. A representative government forms an important element both in a parliamentary and presidential political system. It can either be adopted in the lower chamber of a political system or be restricted, through constitutional constraints, in the upper chamber (Runciman, 2007). Some political theorists have described this type of government as polyarchy, which means that massive political power is bestowed on the various representatives that are appointed by the people through political elections.

As explained by Luce (2007), representatives in this type of government are usually elected by members of the public through national elections and they hold authority to elect other representatives into “indirect representation”. The representatives’ power is often controlled by a constitution or other measures intended to balance power in the representative government. Through such regulations, an independent judiciary may declare certain actions undertaken by members of the representative government as unconstitutional. Representatives in this type of government are not merely supposed to comply with the electorate’s wishes but to use their own reasoning and judgment in executing their power irrespective of whether their wishes are not in line with those of majority of the electorate. This shows that a representative government may not always represent the demands placed by members of the wider societal group, which may in return attribute to some form of crisis (Gastil, 2014). This paper probes whether the representative government in Europe is in crisis.

The Representative Government in Europe Is In Crisis

            For more than thirty years since the end of Second World War, most mainstream parties in Europe have been in constant competition in support to and protest against the representative government. According to Judge and Earnshaw (2012), the revolutionaries on the left wing perceive the positive case of representative government where they describe it as being naïve at its best as well as self-serving at its worst. The collapse of Berlin wall led to significant decline in most European citizens’ self-proclaimed democracies, increased marginalization of socialist politics and the subsequent resistance to representative government. However, those who remained loyal to the representative form of governance have argued that it is most appropriate for a complex society like Europe despite the various complexities that it has continued to face. Their argument is that since the representative government has increasingly been deprived of its historic enemy, which comprises of the integration of liberal and social reformist democracy, it has been posed to severe constraints resulting from the growing ability by the market to rule the state (Micossi, 2008). This is because, the tendency, by the market to rule the state has increasingly generated a political economy that is commonly termed to as “neo-liberalism”, which tends to be destructive of true democracy. As a result, these contradicting arguments in support of and against this form of government have continued to form basis for growing debates pertaining to whether representative government in Europe is in crisis or not.

The fact that Europe has failed to comply with most conditions necessary for a democratic state shows that its representative government is in crisis. One important factor indicating that the representative government in Europe is in crisis emanates from the fact that the region is not a state, even though it has many features linked to a state, and its members cannot be termed as sub-states but independent states themselves. According to Urbinati (2008), a legitimate representative government ought to exhibit aspects of a sovereign state, which is not the case with Europe. This is because Europe has only remained as an amalgamation of independent states to which the concept of conferral applies. While political theorists argue that the legitimacy of a representative government can only be apparent in the context of a traditional nation state, the existence of Europe in its non-state form denies legitimacy to its representative government thereby leaving it in crisis. As pertains to its structure as well as operation, Europe is not an outright inter-governmental institution such as the UN or a federal entity such as the United States. As such, Europe finds it challenging to strike a satisfactory balance between demands as well as interests of individual states and their respective citizens. In order to achieve this balance, Europe ought to have leaders in the representative government that look beyond the two strategies by realizing that an intergovernmental institution cannot be a political union and a federal entity cannot be a federal state (Hage, 2008). However, Europe’s political elites have shaped the representative government into a form of international organization with a unique type of constitutional federalism. This has in return distanced the political leaders from common citizens thereby being unable to integrate their interests to those of the wider state. Such disintegration has left the representative government in crisis especially because it has failed to serve interests of the people but instead has served interests of political as well as economic elites (Colomer, 2012).

Party cleavages in various states in Europe have also proven to expose the representative government in the region to crisis. According to Fouilleux (2005), the emergence of contesting multi-party politics in Poland, Hungary as well as the Slovakia republics has perpetuated party cleavages that have proven to promote democratic deficit and the subsequent crisis in respective representative governments. Party cleavages in these governments have proven to enhance increased integration between electorates and their preferred representatives thereby converting Europe into “a region of parties” rather than “a region of unified nation states”. Although the multi-party system was initially introduced by member states to enhance a close union between electorates and the government, the fact that the representative government in these states is largely occupied by technocratic political cartels has perpetuated democratic deficit, which in return expose it to crisis. Party cleavages in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia have divided Europe into a supranational paradigm on one hand and an intergovernmental paradigm on the other. As such, electorates do not cast their votes on basis of the pros and cons exhibited by a particular subject but on basis of the political party they identifies with, which determine whether he/she is likely to bring solutions that are close to their preferred position. This denies popular representation of various needs exhibited by individuals in the wider society as political leaders are only interested in meeting the needs of electorates that are likely to vote them in and retain them in their political positions rather than addressing the needs of the wider society. This has perpetuated constant crisis in the representative government in these regions especially because complaints associated with lack of popular involvement of the entire civil society in the decision making process have constantly been raised (Gerring, 2009).

The level of stability experienced in UK, France, Italy and Spain as a result of party cleavages however shows that the representative government in Europe may not be in crisis. As explained by Judge and Earnshaw (2012), party cleavages in these countries have been an important platform through which conflicts related to representation have been resolved and democracy obtained. Most parties in these countries undergo a period of fragmentation after competing during the first elections. This is often as a result of failing to secure sizeable voter support, after which the parties review as well as consolidate their party systems. As a result, political elites get an opportunity to review their level of commitment in integrating interests of the state to those of the wider public. This means that the political parties obtaining a high level of public support are only those committed to the interests on the wider society, which in return promotes overall democracy. This shows that the representative government in Europe may not be in crisis especially because it comprises of government officials that are committed in integrating interests of the state to those of the wider society.

Biased interest representation and the subsequent definition of matters in the European Union as they impact members of the civil society further indicates that the representative government in Europe is in crisis. According to Gastil (2014), coordinated civil society needs and interests of varying kinds often contribute to the perception, description as well as presentation of issues in EU’s policymaking and implementation activities. This in return determines policy outcomes that can either enhance or limit democratic representation of the various needs affecting members of the wider societal spectrum. Poland is one of the essential political actors that do not only influence the policy making process in the EU but it as well shapes democratic integration in the region. As argued by Gastil (2014) equal representation of various states has been maintained at the EU by ensuring that politicians and government officials do not solely regulate the process of decision-making and policy outcome. This however is not the case in Poland in that it has perpetuated greater involvement of certain interest groups while limiting the participation of others. For instance, Poland has perpetuated greater involvement of business interest groups in formalized dialogues than other civil groups. This in return ensures that the needs presented by business civil groups are given a higher preference when defining social issues that need consideration during policy formulation at the EU than those presented by other groups. This domination of business interests over other civil interests in Poland emanates from historical aspect of Europe as an economic community, which gives business groups greater significance compared to other groups. However, the domination has exposed the Polish representative government in crisis as most other groups experience biased representation in state affairs, which in return affect the representation of their needs in EU (Druckman, 2008).

Interest aggregation, which allows biased presentation of political demands presented by certain groups as well as individuals, is another factor explaining that the representative government in Europe is in crisis. According to Micossi (2008), interest aggregation defines the various methods that are often adopted by certain individuals in order to effect change. Such methods are commonly known as personal interest aggregation methods and are often integrated into policy programs as a way of seeking support as well as making particular demands from the government. The impact of this factor is widely experienced in Scandinavia, which follows successful emergence of the social democratic political parties in the country. The parties have exhibited a significant level of success, measurable in terms of votes, membership as well as office bearing (Hix, 2007). While this level of success does not compare to other parties in the country, the social democratic parties have significant representation in various arenas, which include various state institutions, the parliament as well as the electoral marketplace. Although these parties are ascribed to various roles, they have gained prominence for their outstanding ability to link members of the wider Scandinavian society to the state. Unlike other parties, the social democratic party has devised a way to address various political as well as the economic preferences presented by the society (Judge and Earnshaw, 2012). As such, the party has established a forum through which various social groups can bargain as well as compromise in order to create a policy platform that can in return be offered to a mass electorate. Most of such social groups constitute of those created by the working classes that operated in the Western Europe in 1900s. They thus defend labor-related interests to be promoted beyond the industrial context into the political context. This is especially because they were particularly created by organizations existing outside any political institution (Colomer, 2012). As such, the social democratic party integrates the society to the state through promoting the implementation of public policy that would enhance collective benefit for the wider society. The fact that the parties are largely inclined towards promoting social interests presented by the labor social groups has perpetuated conflict in Scandinavia, which further intensifies the level of crisis prevailing in the representative government. This is because many other social groups are unable to participate in the forums intended to create a policy platform through which various social interests would be defended (Runciman, 2007).

The fact that other groups are not restricted from forming common interests that can be presented in the mass electorate however indicates that the representative government in Europe may not be in crisis. Although the Democratic Social parties in Scandinavia may seem to incline its policy contents towards labor-related interests, other groups are as well free to develop their own interests and present them in the public forums, as long as they address the needs and interests on the wider society. Such groups do not have any rational base to raise chaos or protest against the representative government, which indicates that the government may not be in crisis.

Low voter turnout during elections in different states is another important factor exposing Europe’s representative government into crisis. According to Urbinati (2008), high turnout during state elections is often perceived to be a primary measure for electorate political engagement in contemporary democracies. On the other hand, low voter turnout portrays an aspect of political disengagement. As such, high turnout is often desirable because it enhances the political system’s ability to represent the will of the largest proportion of people, which in return ensures that the government is able to enjoy a great deal of legitimacy. However, different European states have experienced a general decline in voter turnout, which intensify the level of crisis that the representative government in Europe is facing. For instance, the average voter turnout in states like Hungary, Netherlands, France, Belgium and Bulgaria has dropped from an average of sixty two percent in 1979 to forty three percent in 2009.

Evidence gathered from other states, including Italy however refutes the claim that the representative government is in crisis. According to Mayoral (2011), voter turnout in Italy has traditionally been constantly on the rise, which is primarily perpetuated by compulsory voting that is sustained by the state. Similarly, different representatives at the state government have played an important role in stimulating great interest in state affairs, which are closely linked to interests presented by individuals as well as social groups in the country. As such, voters have widely portrayed great participation in state elections with the hope of voting in reliable representatives that can defend interests of the civil population while on the other hand laying down political elites that are only interested in perpetuating their personal interests. This shows that the representative government in Europe may not be in crisis as members of the public are able to agree on the kind representatives needed in the representative governments as well as those that are not needed (Haskell, 2011).

Institutional complexities that affect the structure, authority, composition as well as procedures further confirm that Europe’s representative government is in crisis. Under institutional context, European Union’s commission is perceived as the most complicated of all other institutions hence a key factor exposing the representative government to crisis. According to Hix (2007), the EU commission’s members cannot either be elected or removed directly through secret ballot. As such, the commission’s source legitimacy primarily originates from the approval vote cast by the European Parliament (EP). This denies the general public any power to choose trusted representatives that can defend as well as integrate their interests with those of the state thereby lowering the level of legitimacy associated with the commission. While the EP holds the power to dismiss the entire commission, there is also a growing concern pertaining to the legitimacy the commission’s power to initiate as well as implement any form of development without the interference and influence of the EP (Druckman, 2008). The implementation of the 1986 Single Market Legislation ought to widen the commission’s authority to establish legislation as well as create implementation rules that ought to prevail in the form of EU regulations. However, EP’s overarching power to elect and dismiss the commission has continually suppressed this power, which limits the legitimacy of the commission’s power and subsequently leaving the representative government into a crisis. Further concerns pertaining to the legitimacy of the commission’s power emanates from the believe that people, during the EP elections, vote representatives in order to articulate the opinion of the national government rather than the opinion of the wider society. For instance, during the 2001 European convention, states such as Italy, UK, Germany and the Netherlands suggested that they would allow most members of the EP rather than the European Council to elect the Commission president (Haskell, 2011). This perpetuated an aspect of federalism, contrary to provisions made in Lisbon Treaty Reforms, which demands that the EP should only elect but not approve a candidate that the Commission has proposed for the Commission presidency. Under these treaty reforms, the European Council is also bestowed with the responsibility of reviewing the outcomes of the most EP elections when proposing a potential candidate for the presidency. The recent changes in the Commission elections however do not conform to these provisions, which perpetuate a certain degree of politicization. This lowers the degree of legitimacy in the commission, which has further exposed the representative government in Europe in crisis (Yigit, 2010).

Further institutional complexity exposing the representative government into crisis is evident in the European Parliament, which has been a central point of focus in shaping arguments relating to democratic legitimacy. According to Runciman (2007), Europe was guided by a basic premise stating that if the EP would assume greater legislative power to undertake the responsibilities of a real assembly, accountability would be enhanced at the national level and constant crisis in the representative government reduced. Because of this premise, the EP, since 1970s, has been bestowed with substantive power, which has particularly resulted from various reforms and rules regulating the adoption of European Union’s annual budget. Such reforms gave the EP authority to veto over unnecessary expenditure through direct elections. The EP, after obtaining such great power, has continued to be regarded as a precursor to EU’s future directly chosen assembly. According to Hix (2009), historical referencing dating back to 1955 indicates that there were significant doubts pertaining to directly chosen assembly. This is because such kind of assembly did not prove to create a collective sense of belonging among electorates and it terminated valuable ties that existed between the assembly on one hand and the national parliaments on the other. It is therefore evident that instilling substantive power on EP has constantly broken the tie that ought to prevail between European national parliaments and the electorates. This has in return perpetuated different representation results as well as lowered the perceived value of representation (Gerring, 2009). As a result, there has been conflicting arguments pertaining to whether any possible change can be instilled in Europe’s representative government, which has exposed it to constant crisis. Another important aspect perpetuating illegitimacy in EP’s institutional arrangement, which subsequently attributes to growing crisis in the representative government, is the fact that the same political majority is serving in both the council and European parliament. This means that EP, despite the fact that it is bestowed with the responsibility of scrutinizing activities taking place in the executive body, is subjugated by the people constituting to the political majority in the executive and parliamentary body (Colomer, 2012). This gives the EP extensive co-decision powers that allow proposals being made in the council to ultimately be imposed. As a result, EP finds it challenging to amend any proposals made by the council, which further limits its legitimacy thereby increasing the level of crisis prevailing in the representative government in Europe. The EP further maximizes its dominance in decision making through exploiting its soft powers, which further lower the legitimacy of the representative government thereby leaving it crisis. According to Beukers (2006), EP has obtained soft powers that include its right to employ the representation of a two-third majority in passing criticizing motions against the Commission, constantly questioning both the Commission and the Council as well as creating a committee of inquiry to probe issues of poor administration in various EU institutions. Despite the various gains that EP has acquired through its soft powers, it is perceived to have relatively greater weakness than the Council and the Commission, which emanates from the fact that it is a directly elected institution. This factor, in addition to the low voter turnout during EP elections shows that the directly elected institution cannot remedy the democratic deficit prevailing in the European Union, which leaves the representative government in further crisis. As argued by Druckman (2008), giving the EP more power only adds a single aspect of democratic deficit without addressing the crisis facing the representative government. This is because more power to the EP only ensures that there is a parliamentary dimension in making rational decisions on legislative and budgetary matters. It however does not help in addressing the various problems linked to holding various EU council ministers accountable for their actions. While this primarily remains to be the responsibility of national parliaments, the EP finds it challenging to accomplish it. This is because it only employs its exclusive power rather than balancing the formal power bestowed under treaties with political resources issued in various national chambers (Gastil, 2014). This forms a significant proportion of legitimacy problem, which further intensifies the crisis prevailing in European representative government.

Sufficient evidence indicates that the various complexities perpetuating crisis in the representative government are increasingly violating people’s ability to engage in self-governance. As such, it is important to devise ways through which such complexities and the subsequent crisis can be dealt with. An important strategy that can be employed in reforming the representative government in Europe and subsequently address the prevailing crisis is a reintegration EU Treaty amendments. These include the amendments that had previously been employed to address the issue of democratic deficit in different member states, improve transparency in these states as well as encourage public participation in various state projects (Franchino, 2009). The Lisbon Treaty can also be appropriate in the proposed reform as it opened public participation in various council sessions, enhanced EP’s authority in legislative as well as budgetary issues, increased its participation in choosing the Commission president, and enhanced public participation through the electorate’s initiative in various sessions between various EU institutions and the wider society. According to Jolly (2013), Andrew Moravcsik compiled a report in 2006 where he maintained that with Lisbon reforms, further modifications on the representative government are not required. This is because the EU itself was the outcome of an intergovernmental agreement that was integrated in the EU treaties. Reintegrating these treaties would thus transform the representative government into a practically efficient, normatively appealing and politically steady institution. This would in return ensure that the representative government is a suitably negotiated equilibrium that is constantly modified when need be.

Another reform that can be used to address the crisis prevailing in the representative government in Europe is through increasing politicization to allow greater public participation in discussing politics. Although the representative government in Europe may portray conflicting legitimization channels exhibited by different states, it does not mean that the prevailing crisis cannot be addressed simply because the government does not have shared values to govern institutional as well as the political actions. It is evident that lack of common identity or shared values between states makes it challenging to refer on a single support base Saward (2009). However, this does not prevent the development of effective mechanisms that legitimize individual decision as well as the decision-making procedures taking place in national parliaments, EP and other institutions taking part in the process. The deficit further does not prevent implementation of various reforms that can enhance legitimization of common action as far as citizen’s participation is concerned. As such, enhancing politicization in various states can perpetuate significant change that can trigger democratic legitimization thereby addressing the crisis prevailing in the representative government (Hage, 2008).

More differentiation at the national level can as well help address various complexities exposing the representative government to crisis. According to Fouilleux (2005), allowing various member states in Europe to follow different paths of interest to them can perpetuate significant differentiation thereby addressing complexities arising from lack of fair interest representation and party cleavages in the representative government. EU can make transitional provisions that limit the accession of new members, allow for opt-outs in membership, as established in various treaties and protocols, make EMU obligations that require new members to comply with provisions made in various treaties as well as make other protocol-based provisions.  Such provisions would enhance flexibility that allows the member states to concentrate more on what they desire to do and less on what they do not desire to do (Colomer, 2012).

Conclusion

            The representative government is an important political concept that is widely accepted in Europe given the fact that it enhances east representation of a huge population prevailing in such a complex society. The need to establish this type of government in Europe resulted from the demand to promote democratic representation of members of a complex European society. Significant changes over the years have however violated this commitment thereby causing most political elites to be more pursuant of greater wealth and power rather than meeting the demands and needs of electorates. This is the case prevailing in Europe, which has seen most people losing faith as well as withdrawing their commitment in the representative government thereby leaving it in crisis. Various factors are to blame for the growing crisis in the representative government in Europe. EU’s inability to comply with various demands and conditions necessary for a legitimate democracy as well as various institutional complexities arising in the Council, the EP and the Commission has exposed the representative government into crisis. Low voter turnout, party cleavages, interest aggregation as well as biased interest representation are also to blame for the growing crisis in the representative government. Certain reforms can however be employed to address the various institutional complexities attributing to the growing crisis in the representative government in the region. The reforms include reintegration of various treaties and protocols, greater politicization at the EP and the Council as well as increased differentiation at various state levels.

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